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RECENT DECISIONS
To permit collateral attacks on judgments on grounds other
than fraud in the procurement or want of jurisdiction 20 would leave
a court without capacity to settle definitely any suit brought before
it, and would render judgments insecure and uncertain. New evidence, confessions of perjurers, mistaken testimony, etc., if permitted
to overthrow a judgment
21 once competently made, would keep lawsuits alive ad infinitum.
J.E.F.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-BANKRUPTCY AS CONDITION SUBSEQUENT OR CONDITIONAL LImITATIoN.-Defendant, assignee of a

lease, was adjudicated bankrupt. Said lease contained a clause "that
an adjudication that the lessee is bankrupt shall ipso facto end and
terminate this lease and any rights thereunder." It was further
provided that the "lessor at its option may rescind and terminate this
agreement upon * * * the breach of any of its conditions, or any of
the covenants or agreements of said lessee." This suit is brought
for rents accruing between the adjudication of bankruptcy and the
disaffirmance of the lease by the receiver. Held, the provision for
a termination of the lease upon the adjudication of bankruptcy constituted a conditional limitation terminating the lease and all obligations thereunder upon its happening. Murray Realty Co. v. Regal
Shoe Co., 265 N. Y. 332, 193 N. E. 164 (1934).
Parties to a lease may create a conditional limitation by providing for the termination of the leasehold estate upon an adjudication of bankruptcy of the lessee.' To effect such result, it is requisite
Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. Sen. 157; Harvey v. Farnie, 8 App. Cas. 43.

In

Cottington's Case, 2 Swanston 326 (1678), Lord Chancellor Nottingham in

the House of Lords said: "It is against the law of nations not to give credit
to the judgments and sentences of foreign countries, till they be reversed by
the law, and according to the form, of those countries wherein they were
given. For what right hath one kingdom to reverse the judgment of another?
And how can we refuse to let a sentence take place till it be reversed? And
what confusion would follow in Christendom, if they should serve us so
abroad, and give no credit to our sentences." The New York cases are in
accord. Guggenheim v. Wahl, 203 N. Y. 390, 96 N. E. 726 (1911).
mSupra note 4.
"Dickens, in Bleak House, writes of the case of "Jarndyce v. Jarndyce,"
which was litigated for four generations over a period of eighty years. Might
not any case in the courts today equal, if not surpass, Dickens' case in
longevity, in the event that the rule for attacking judgments collaterally were
extended?
2Jane v. Paddell, 67 Misc. 420, 122 N. Y. Supp. 760 (1910) ; Lichtenstein
v. Groton Laundry Service, 123 Misc. 942, 206 N. Y. Supp. 579 (1924) ; In re
Outfitters' Operating Realty Co., 69 F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
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that the adjudication of bankruptcy be the act that ends the estate.2
Even the implication that some further act is necessary to bring the
term to a close will prevent the clause from being construed as a
conditional limitation.3

When the fact itself 4 will suffice to ter-

minate the grant, the mere filing of a petition in bankruptcy will
terminate the lease. 5 It is equally competent for the parties to create a condition subsequent by giving the lessor the option to terminate the estate upon the bankruptcy of the tenant. 6 When such
a situation exists, it is the exercise of the option by the landlord that
brings about the ending of the term and not the adjudication.7 The
distinction between the two types of conditions is very obvious. It
lies in the necessity for the declaration of an end of the relation in
a condition subsequent while no such necessity exists in the conditional limitation. 8
In an agreement of this kind the language 9 employed should
be strictly construed 10 so as to give effect to the intention of the
parties."
M. E. W.

LIMITATIONS

OF ACTIONS-BANKS AND BANKING.-Plaintiff

seeks to recover the amount of several checks which had been paid
out by defendant on forged indorsements. The checks were issued
by plaintiff as pension money over a period of eighteen months, dur2 Miller v. Levi, 44 N. Y. 489 (1871); Matter of Szpakowski, 166 App.
Div. 578, 151 N. Y. Supp. 211 (4th Dept. 1915); Ashton Holding Co., Inc. v.
Levitt, 191 App. Div. 91, 180 N. Y. Supp. 700 (1st Dept. 1920) ; 507 Madison
Avenue v. Martin, 200 App. Div. 146, 192 N. Y. Supp. 762 (1st Dept. 1922)
Lonas v. Silver, 201 App. Div. 383, 195 N. Y. Supp. 214 (Zd Dept. 1922).
' Schneider v. Springman, 25 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928).
'Supra note 2.
'In re Outfitters' Operating Realty Co., supra note 1, the court stated
"that * * * mere filing of petition in bankruptcy puts an end to lease, not at
lessor's option, but unconditionally."
6 it re Roth v. Appel, 181 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910) ; Beach v. Nixon,
9 N. Y. 35 (1853); Woodworth v. Harding, 75 App. Div. 54, 77 N. Y. Supp.
969 (4th Dept. 1902); Witthaus v. Zimmerman, 91 App. Div. 202, 86 N. Y.
Supp. 315 (1st Dept. 1904) ; Broadex Realty Corp. v. Jones, 211 App. Div. 96,
206 N. Y. Supp. 602 (lst Dept. 1924).
Ibid.
'Supra note 2.
'Jane v. Paddell, supra note 1; 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT §36
at 289.
" Gillette Bros. v. Aristocrat Restaurant, 239 N. Y. 87, 145 N. E. 748
(1924); In In re Schneider v. Springman, supra note 3, a provision that the
lease was to be forfeited upon lessee's bankruptcy was held not equivalent to a
provision that lease should be "terminated" since the words "terminated" and
"forfeited" were not synonymous and that "forfeited" implied election.
" Raymond v. Hodgson, 55 Ill. App. 423; Anzalone v. Paskuz, 96 App.
Div. 188, 89 N. Y. Supp. 203 (1st Dept. 1904) ; City of New York v. United
States Trust Co., 116 App. Div. 349, 101 N. Y. Supp. 574 (lst Dept. 1906).

